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INTRODUCTION
The incoherence of takings law is legend.' Explanations of the
incoherence are numerous,2 as are attempts to dispel it.3 Some
have offered "scientific" accounts,4 while others' accounts are more
This discussion is restricted to alleged takings of real estate; litigants have, however,
resorted to the takings clause in many other contexts. See, e.g., Comment, Gideon's Trum-
pet at the Crossroads . . .Is It Taps Or Reveille?, 17 S.W. U.L. REV. 351, passim (1987)
(discussing application of takings clause to an attorney's right to practice law). While my
analysis may shed light on takings of property other than real estate, such illumination is
coincidental.
2 See, e.g., Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A
Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Prop-
erty, 19 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 685, 692 (1986) (referring to constitutional aspect of land use law
as being in a state of chaos); Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage,"
And "Bundle of Rights" From Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 ENVTL. AFF. 653,
654 (1987) (regulatory takings jurisprudence has mystifying nature); Large, The Supreme
Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 50 (1987)
("takings issue will continue to befuddle students"); Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the
1987 Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PROP. L.
J. 39 (1988) ("one step forward and two steps backward along the path toward a coherent
takings jurisprudence"); Comment, Eminent Domain by Regulation: Developing a Unified
Field Theory for the Regulatory Taking, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 197, 202 (1987)
("search for regulatory taking standards has been compared to the physicist's hunt for the
quark").
3 See, e.g., Humbach, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Take Private Property:
Public Purpose and Public Use, 66 OR. L. REV. 547 (1988); Humbach, A Unifying Theory
for the Just-Compensation Cases: Taking, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REv.
243, 245 (1982) ("it is possible not merely to reconcile the police-power taking cases with
one another, but also to develop a theory unifying those cases with the general law of emi-
nent domain"); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme
Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 358 (1988) (suggesting plausible, consistent read-
ing of the two different formulations); Ragsdale, A Synthesis and Integration Of Supreme
Court Precedent Regarding The Regulatory Taking of Land, 55 UmKc L. REV. 213 (1987)
(attempting to synthesize regulatory taking doctrine).
" Bruce Ackerman originally made the distinction between "scientific" and "ordinary"
accounts. A scientific approach uses technical concepts of legal discourse, while an ordinary
approach uses the "ordinary talk of non-lawyers." See B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 10-22 (1977). Among the scientific accounts of takings law are R. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Michelman, Prop-
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ordinary.5 Some abhor the incoherence;8 others seem almost to re-
vel in it.' The Supreme Court has done little to relieve the confu-
sion, resorting instead to "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"8
whenever confronted with an alleged taking.
The apparent incoherence of takings law is a challenge to the
presumption that law is a system with integrity, i.e., a system
which is both coherent and principled. I use "integrity" both in the
Dworkinian sense that law should be viewed "as a coherent and
structured whole,"9 and in the related and more common sense
that legal practitioners (lawyers and judges) should be presumed to
behave in a principled way. 10 The challenge to the integrity of the
legal system of the apparently incoherent and unprincipled body of
takings law is met if takings law can be understood in a principled
way.
Understanding takings law in a principled way means under-
standing that body of law without reducing it to, say, politics or
economics. 1 In a legal system with integrity, it must be possible to
erty, Utility and Fairness: Comments on The Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
' See, e.g., Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme
Court's Search for a Solution Continues, 18 URB. 635, 637 (1986) (straightforward examina-
tion of recent takings cases, exploring possibility of adverse effect of regulation on large
monetary awards to landowners).
See, e.g., Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Taking: A Decisional Model for the Tak-
ing Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 528 (1983) (remarking on "unproductive ambivalence and
conflict that pervade current takings commentary"); Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings
Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URi. L.J. 157 (1987-88);
Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan" And Post Hoc Ratio-
nalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial Review of Land Use Regulations,
16 STETSON L. REV. 603 (1987); Comment, supra note 2, at 202 ("it is critical that the courts
promulgate clear regulatory taking standards and establish uniform criteria for valuing the
compensation due").
See, e.g., Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 372, 425 (1986) (takings jurisprudence will probably remain "untidy and confused").
8 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
0 R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400 (1986).
10 Other areas of the law present challenges to this presumption. See, e.g., Greenstein,
The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
855, 856 (1987) (offering account which makes sense of incoherence of due process limita-
tions on personal jurisdiction); Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 936 (1987) (outlines model which courts may use to resolve political protest cases in
more coherent manner).
1 See, e.g., R. EPsTEIN, supra note 4, (constitutionality of legislation hinges on eco-
nomic efficiency and distribution of costs and benefits).
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make sense of takings law from the "internal point of view,"'" and
not merely from an external point of view.13 Understanding takings
law in a principled way does not, however, mean that takings law
must be "reduced to formal rules.""' While my account includes
appeal to certain formal rules, I do not deny the place of balancing
in takings law.1 5 The choice is not between per se rules which settle
each and every takings case in advance and ad hoc balancing
which settles nothing in advance. 6 Rather, takings law, properly
understood, involves both formal rules and balancing.
I offer the following hypothesis about the jurisprudence of tak-
ings, 7 in order to provide a useful set of presumptions for under-
standing takings cases. The account is dubbed "hypothetical" be-
12 See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-88 (1961). Jurisprudential theories which ac-
count for law solely in external terms (for example, reducing law to politics) are deficient, in
Hart's view, because they define the internal point of view out of existence. See R. DwoR-
KIN, supra note 9, at 13-14.
"' This is not to say that external points of view are not important. If judges decide
takings cases in order to serve economic efficiency, for example, this would raise the ques-
tion whether decisions on the basis of efficiency (as opposed to fairness) were appropriate.
Thus, information from the external point of view becomes relevant to a principled practi-
tioner operating from the internal point of view.
14 See Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurispru-
dence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1684 (1988). Professor Radin argues that "ne-
oconservatives think that if takings jurisprudence cannot be reduced to formal rules ... it
must violate the Rule of Law." Id. She concludes, however, that "this is a field in which
pragmatic judgment under a standard-an explicit balancing approach-is better." Id.
18 Much of a recent symposium in the Columbia Law Review poses a false dichotomy
between these two approaches to takings law. See Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Tak-
ings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988) [hereinafter Symposium]; see also Fischel, Introduc-
tion: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581 (1988) (Pro-
fessor Fischel introduces the Symposium as one containing two distinct viewpoints-rules
versus balancing). This is a false dichotomy which is beginning to plague jurisprudence gen-
erally. See, e.g., McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C.L. REv. 585, 586 (1988) ("The 'bal-
ancing test'... . directs a judge to eschew the application of formal rules in deciding a case,
and instead to balance the competing interests of the litigants (or the competing interests of
society more generally), and to give judgment for the side with the weightier interests").
'" The choice, in Hart's words, is not between "a core of certainty and a penumbra of
doubt." H. HART, supra note 12, at 119.
1? The function of a legal hypothesis is to bring coherence to a body of law; the better
the account explains a body of law, and the better that account "fits" with other bodies of
law, the more "true" it is. It may be that my account bears some resemblance to what
Ackerman would call an account of an Ordinary Observer. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 4,
at 4. I do not take the view, however, that legal language is or should be "ordinary" in the
sense required of Ackerman's Ordinary Observer, but neither do I take the position that
takings law can be understood by, or should be remade to fit, some "scientific" theory or
Comprehensive View. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. As a methodological matter,
the presumption of integrity in the legal system requires that we take courts to mean what
they say, and that we deconstruct or reconstruct what they say as little as necessary.
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cause, although it is accurate descriptively (courts in fact do as I
suggest) and plausible prescriptively (courts should do as I sug-
gest),18 I am not so bold as to claim that mine is the only plausible
account. Nonetheless, if the account makes principled sense of tak-
ings law, at least the challenge to the integrity of the legal system
generally is met.
This Article first describes the "takings" problem and then
summarizes the hypothetical solution. An annotated version of the
hypothesis follows the summary.
THE "TAKINGS" PROBLEM
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution impose two limits on the power of government 9 to
interfere with property rights. The fifth amendment provides that
no person shall "be deprived of. . . property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. '20 Implicit in the statement of these limitations
on government authority is the acknowledgement that government
has the powers, with due process of law, to deprive a person of
property and, upon payment of just compensation, to take private
property for public use." These powers are traditionally referred
to as the police power and the power of eminent domain.22 The due
18 1 have not constructed a model of takings jurisprudence which is both descriptive
and prescriptive; at least, not in the sense that all judges do and should answer takings
questions in the same way. See Ross,. supra note 7. I have constructed a descriptive/pre-
scriptive model in the sense that courts faced with takings typically do and should ask the
questions that I pose. In this regard, I differ from Ronald Dworkin in that I do not believe
that there is one right answer to any particular takings case, but I do believe that there are
right questions. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Ch. 13 (1978).
I9 "Government" is used broadly to include all levels (local, regional, state, national)
involved in the regulation of land use.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which
limits the authority of state government, and the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
which limits the authority of the federal government, are, for our purposes, identical in
effect. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that the fifth amendment due
process clause has equal protection component). Through incorporation, the fifth amend-
ment just compensation clause limits the authority of state, as well as the federal, govern-
ment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
21 It is irrelevant to this discussion whether these powers are retained by the govern-
ment or are created by the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S.
230, 241-42 (1946) ("Fifth Amendment ... is a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to
take private property for public use").
22 Whether the eminent domain power is a subset of the police power or a separate
power is also of little consequence to our analysis. The United States Supreme Court ap-
pears to take the view that any exercise of the eminent domain power in pursuit of legiti-
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process clause prohibits the arbitrary exercise of government
power,23 whereas the just compensation clause requires exercise of
the eminent domain power when private property is "taken for
public use."
While there is thus an evident distinction between "depriva-
tions of property without due process" and "takings of property
for public use," some courts have failed to make a clear distinction
between the two limitations on government authority, incoherently
holding, for example, that a land use regulation which deprives a
landowner of property without due process also takes the property
for public use.24 In other words, courts frequently fail to make the
distinction between two ways in which government may abuse its
power: first, government may act arbitrarily, in violation of due
process; second, government may so intrusively regulate the use of
property in pursuit of legitimate police power objectives as to take
the property without compensation, in violation of the just com-
pensation clause. In the first case, the government action is simply
invalid; in the second case, the government action is invalid absent
compensation, and so government may either abandon its regula-
tion or validate its action by payment of appropriate compensa-
mate police power objectives is constitutional, suggesting that the eminent domain power is
either a subset of the police power or at least identical in its scope. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1983) ("The 'public use' requirement is... coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."); see also infra notes 41-61 and accompany-
ing text.
2 "[T]he guaranty of due process... demands only that the law shall not be unreason-
able, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
This guaranty of due process applies to whatever power government is exercising, be it the
police power, the eminent domain power, the taxing power, or any other power. See Gallo-
way, Means-End Scrutiny In American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 449
(1988). Means-end scrutiny remains "the most common form of analysis used by courts in
enforcing constitutional limits on government action," id. at 449, despite Professor Hans
Linde's spirited rejection of the approach. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.
L. REv. 197 (1976). Linde suggests that "the dogma that due process requires every law to
be a rational means to a legislative end is... not a rational premise for judicial review, and.
is even less plausible as a constitutional command to lawmakers." Id. at 235-36.
24 See, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 138 Misc. 2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987). The Seawall court said, "[hlaving found Local Law 9 violates
plaintiffs' due process rights the next issue is whether Local Law 9's regulatory scheme con-
stitutes an unconstitutional taking for which just compensation must be made." Id. at 109,
523 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62. That such a conclusion is incoherent will appear more clearly later.
See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text. Here, let it suffice to say that a land use
regulation which violates due process ipso facto serves no legitimate public purpose and so
does not take property "for public use."
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tion, i.e., by exercising its power of eminent domain.2 The failure
to distinguish between these two abuses of government power has
contributed to the confusion and apparent incoherence of takings
law.
26
When faced with an allegation of the first kind of abuse of
government power, the appropriate question for courts to ask is
whether the government action is substantially related to a legiti-
mate government purpose. This is typically a fairly clear inquiry.27
When faced with an allegation of the second kind of abuse of
government power, however, courts seem to have an inordinate
amount of trouble establishing criteria for determining whether a
particular exercise of power effects a taking for public use, so as to
require exercise of eminent domain. Whether the property has
been taken for public use is a question which is especially puzzling
to courts which fail to distinguish between the two kinds of abuse.
25 "Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the
whole range of options already available-amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the
invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain." First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
26 The Supreme Court has also contributed to this confusion. See, e.g., Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). "The application of a general zoning law to particular prop-
erty effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests." Id. at 260 (citations omitted). What the Agins court suggests, of course, is that the
application of a general zoning law deprives an owner of property without due process if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. See also City of Pitts-
burgh v. Arco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974), in which the Court reviewed a decision of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidating a Pittsburgh ordinance "as an uncompensated
taking of property contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 371. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, but did not correct the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's mischaracterization of the case as a "Fourteenth Amendment taking." Id.
at 378-79. Some commentators are guilty of similar confusion. See Strong, On Placing Prop-
erty Due Process Center Stage in Takings Jurisprudence, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 591, 592 (1988).
Dean Strong argues that, under Pennsylvania Coal, the takings clause is not an indepen-
dent source of recovery, but rather permits recovery only for exercises of the police power
which violate due process by "go[ing] too far." Id. He claims that this is the meaning of
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal. Id. I concede that Pennsylvania Coal is in-
deed a due process case. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. But it is a mistake to
suggest that the takings clause provides no independent remedy. Government violates the
due process clause by regulating without a public purpose; in that case, no taking has oc-
curred regardless of the effect of the regulation on private property. The just compensation
clause provides independent justification for invalidating otherwise legitimate exercises of
the police power which so interfere with a property owner's rights as to effect an uncompen-
sated taking. For all his insistence that he has clarified matters, it would seem that Dean
Strong has obscured them.
27 The inquiry has been recently clouded by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See infra notes 75-87
and accompanying text.
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These courts fail to recognize that the question whether a govern-
ment regulation serves a public use is precisely the same as the
question whether the regulation serves a legitimate public pur-
pose.2 8 The more difficult question, and the question which distin-
guishes analysis of the first kind of abuse of government power
from the second, is whether a particular, otherwise legitimate, ex-
ercise of government power constitutes a taking at all. This ques-
tion also unduly confuses courts, and is perhaps the leading con-
tributor to the apparent intractability of the takings problem.
THE HYPOTHESIS: SUMMARIZED
The takings question is presented when government seeks to
achieve a particular purpose, and chooses to use some form of land
use control to achieve that purpose.29 The question can therefore
be usefully recast as a series of questions about the nature of the
government end and the relationship between that end and the
means chosen to achieve it:30
Q1. Is the government's end legitimate?
28 That these questions are identical was once clear to the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1983). "The 'public use' requirement [of
the fifth amendment] is ... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id.
at 240; see also infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. The Court has recently lost its
clarity on this point. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). In
the Nollan Court's discussion of the standards "for determining what constitutes a 'legiti-
mate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest
satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter," the Court said,
"our opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due
process ... claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have gener-
ally been quite different." Id. at 834 n.3.. While the "verbal formulations" have sometimes
been different in the takings context and the due process context, the "substantial relation-
ship" test relied on by the courts in takings cases is derived from, and is in principle indis-
tinguishable from, the "substantial relationship" test in due process cases. See infra notes
75-87 and accompanying text.
29 Whether government entities in fact adopt ends and choose between means to
achieve them, is rather doubtful. See Linde, supra note 23, at 201-22. Nonetheless, the judi-
cial presumption of legislative rationality requires courts, when reviewing legislative and
other governmental actions, to assess the relationship of means to ends. Certainly, courts
persist in using such language, and our presumption of judicial integrity requires that we
take them at their word.
30 We might pose a "Question Zero," so-called because it is a pre-taking threshold ques-
tion, whether a real property right is implicated by the government action. However, there
will be little said about that question here, there being ample commentary on what counts
as a property interest. See Humbach, supra note 3, at 584-91; Ragsdale, supra note 3, at
216; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-46 (1964); Sax, supra note 4, at 155-
72.
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If not, the government action is invalid;
if so
Q2. Is the means substantially related to the end?
If not, the government action is invalid;
if so
Q3. Does the means permanently destroy an essential property
right?
If so, the government action is invalid absent compensation;
if not
Q4. Does the value to the public of the end outweigh the private
harm occasioned by the means?
If not, the government action is invalid absent compensation;
if so, the government action is valid.
While these questions contain terms which need further clari-
fication (e.g. "essential property right," "value to the public"), they
should have a familiar ring to anyone who has contemplated tak-
ings law. The first two questions are traditional due process ques-
tions; the last two questions should be recognizable takings ques-
tions. The answers, too, should strike a familiar chord, although
the remedial presumptions may be unfamiliar.
Summarized, the rules of decision implicit in this analysis are:
an illegitimate end justifies no means; even a legitimate end justi-
fies only related means; no end justifies any uncompensated means
which permanently destroys an essential property right; and, the
end otherwise justifies the means when the value to the public of
the end outweighs the private harm resulting from the means. It is
worth noting that the questions are asked in hierarchical order,31
and so a takings case may be disposed of by answering the current
question one way or another, at any stage in the analysis. So, for
example, a government regulation which serves no legitimate pur-
pose is invalidated no later in the analysis than Q2. By so dispos-
ing of a case, a court need not enter the morass which awaits at Q4.
Similarly, Q4 is avoided when a court determines that the govern-
ment regulation, however weighty its purpose, permanently de-
stroys an essential property right. The truly difficult cases, those
which indeed require a balancing of public against private inter-
" But see Martinez, supra note 6. "Courts employ two legal theories to ascertain
whether government action has so affected property as to warrant a remedy: the 'due pro-
cess approach' and the 'just compensation approach.'" Id. at 164. These two approaches
should be viewed not as different theories but as part of a single theory.
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ests, are a relatively small subset of takings cases,32 and there is
even a subset of these cases (the "nuisance" cases) which are rela-
tively easy to resolve."3
THE HYPOTHESIS: ANNOTATED
The annotated solution is divided into two sections, the liabil-
ity phase and the remedy phase. Much of the confusion in takings
law arises because courts and commentators fail to distinguish
these two phases. 4
I. THE LIABILITY PHASE
In each section an initial philosophical justification for the
rule of decision under consideration will be articulated. Inspiration
is drawn, sometimes explicitly, from two philosophers whose works
are, for rather different reasons, congenial to the U.S. system of
government: Locke and Hegel.35 Rules, however, are abstract and
can be fully understood only in application. Accordingly, each sec-
tion examines judicial decisions to understand better how the rule
works in practice.30
3' Although some cases are truly difficult in that they require a balancing of public
against private interests, this does not mean that takings law is incoherent or unprincipled.
See infra notes 132-52 and accompanying text. Courts frequently reach the balancing stage
of the analysis unnecessarily, exacerbating the apparent incoherence of takings law. See,
e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 553, 565, 720 P.2d 528, 540 (1985) (court found
zoning ordinance to be invalid exercise of police power yet continued to examine whether
ordinance denied all economically viable use of land); Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344
N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984) (court found city physically occupied plaintiffs property by
flooding it but proceeded to balance the two conflicting interests); Annicelli v. Town of
South Kingston, 463 A.2d 133, 141 (R.I. 1983) (court analyzed whether all reasonable use
was denied after holding that there had been invalid exercise of police power).
" See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
' I choose Locke and Hegel because Locke is fairly representative of what might be
called the individualist tradition and Hegel is representative of what might be called the
communitarian tradition.
11 This approach is consistent with the general Hegelian view that principles must be
worked out in practice; only by examining judicial applications of rules and principles can
we understand what those rules and principles mean. See generally C. TAYLOR, HEGEL AND
MODERN SOCIETY (1979). The approach is also consistent with our presumption of integrity
in the judicial process, which requires, as a methodological matter, that we take courts at
their word. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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A. The Rules of Decision
1. An Illegitimate End Justifies No Means
The legitimacy of the government's purpose in enacting or ap-
plying a particular land use regulation has been given infrequent
attention by the courts since the declaration in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty3 7 that comprehensive zoning serves the legitimate
police power objectives of preserving the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.3 Legitimacy of purpose is nonetheless
an extremely important threshold question. If government action
serves no legitimate purpose, the action is arbitrary and can be jus-
tified under no plausible theory of government.3 9 Government may
pursue only legitimate goals. As a practical matter, we can answer
the question of legitimacy by examining the decisions of courts
faced with takings claims. 40
It seems well established that government may regulate land
use in pursuit of any otherwise permissible goal. In Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v. Midkiff' the Supreme Court reiterated its view,
first articulated in Berman v. Parker,42 that "[t]he 'public use' re-
quirement [of the fifth amendment] is .. .coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign's police powers. '43 The Court held that it was
within the police power of Hawaii-hence within the "public use"
limitation of the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment-to require certain owners of Hawaiian real estate to sell it
37 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11 Id. at 389-90.
'9 Locke explicitly rejects any arbitrary exercise of government power. J. LOCKE, SEC-
OND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 135-37 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698). Hegel
gives an account of arbitrary government action according to which the choice between
equally effective alternative means to achieve a particular end is arbitrary, as opposed to
philosophically necessary. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 214 (T.M. Knox trans. 1971).
This kind of arbitrariness is not prescribed under the theory offered here.
40 The question of the legitimacy of government goals occurs in many different con-
texts. Since our concern is with land-use regulation, we shall focus on the legitimacy of
government goals only in that context. It is worth noting that means-end scrutiny in this
context is of the lowest level, as classifications on the basis of property ownership are not
inherently suspect, and ordinary property ownership is not a fundamental right. See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7 to 16-11 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Radin
has suggested that governmental interference with personal property (which she distin-
guishes from fungible property) should be given a higher level of scrutiny. See Radin, supra
note 14, at 1691.
41 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
42 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
43 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
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to their tenants in order "to reduce the perceived social and eco-
nomic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to [Hawaii's] monarchs."' 4
The decision indicated that a court's role in reviewing a legisla-
ture's judgment of what constitutes a public use (i.e. a legitimate
public purpose) is "an extremely narrow one." ''
How narrow this role is recently became clear in Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.46 In that case, a re-
prise of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,47 several Pennsyl-
vania coal companies challenged Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, prohibiting mining that
causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, private
dwellings, and cemeteries.48 The Pennsylvania Department of En-
vironmental Resources, authorized under the Act to issue regula-
tions to implement the Act, adopted a formula requiring 50% of
the coal beneath protected structures to remain in place to provide
surface support.49 The coal companies sued, alleging a taking in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Rejecting the companies' takings claim, the Supreme Court
contrasted the Subsidence Act with the Kohler Act, challenged in
Pennsylvania Coal. In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court in
Pennsylvania Coal had found the Kohler Act invalid because it
served merely private interests. 50 The Subsidence Act, on the other
" Id. at 241-42.
" Id. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
17 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court invalidated the Kohler Act,
which prohibited mining that caused subsidence under certain structures, on the grounds
that it was an invalid exercise of the police power. Id. at 414-15. In Keystone, the Court
examined a similar Pennsylvania statute, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Con-
servation Act, which required that 50% of the coal beneath certain structures remain in
place to provide surface support. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
11 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476.
49 Id. at 476-77.
50 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14. It is an enduring fiction of takings law that
Pennsylvania Coal applied the fifth amendment just compensation clause to a land use
regulation; in fact, the Kohler Act was invalidated on the classical due process grounds that
it served no public purpose. Having so found, Justice Holmes "uncharacteristically... pro-
vided the parties with an advisory opinion discussing the 'general validity of the Act.'"
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted). Justice Holmes advised in dictum
that a regulation which "goes too far" might amount to a de facto exercise of the eminent
domain power, and so compensation would be required to make the regulation legitimate.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Professor Michelman dismisses Justice Stevens'
characterizion of this latter aspect of Justice Holmes' opinion as dictum, calling it an "amaz-
ing reconstruction." Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUm. L. REv. 1600, 1600 n.2 (1988).
However, Justice Stevens' opinion finally lays to rest the myth that Pennsylvania Coal was
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hand, bore "[n] one of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the
benefit of private parties identified in Justice Holmes' opinion." 1
By passage of the Subsidence Act, "the Commonwealth is acting to
protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fis-
cal integrity of the area. ' 52 In reaching this conclusion, the Su-
preme Court essentially took the Pennsylvania legislature at its
word.5 3 The dissenting Justices, while disagreeing with the major-
ity's analysis of the takings question, agreed that the Subsidence
Act served a legitimate public purpose. The dissenters did not dis-
pute the appropriateness of deferring to legislative judgment on
the question. 4
This analysis seems to suggest that virtually any purpose pur-
sued by a legislature is legitimate. As the Court noted in Berman v.
Parker,55 the legislative judgment is "well-nigh conclusive."5 6 As a
matter of process, this is not surprising. A truly representative
body can be expected to pursue goals which are in the interest of
its constituency; minority interests can be presumed to be properly
represented. 57
a takings case, rather than a due process case.
0' Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 486.
82 Id. at 488.
5S Id. at 486-88. The act provided that it "shall be deemed to be an exercise of the
police powers of the Commonwealth for the protection of the health, safety and general
welfare of the people of the Commonwealth." Id. at 1242 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 52, §
1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986)). The Court found no reason to dispute the legislature's posi-
tion. The Court's willingness to defer to legislative judgment in 1987 and not in 1922 was
partly a function of the judicial climate of the two eras. In 1922, the Court was still active in
its review of economic legislation and was more willing to scrutinize legislative means and
ends sought. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Weaver v. Palmer Bros.
Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926). Nonetheless, in both Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone Bitumi-
nous, the Court applied the same principle of substantive law: legislation must serve legiti-
mate public interests.
' Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 510-11. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
86 Id. at 32.
17 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In this fa-
mous footnote, the Court expressed the view that discrete and insular minorities, which are
underrepresented in the political process, may seek the protection of the courts against
majoritarian excess. Implicit in this statement is the principle that interests which are rep-
resented in the political process have little judicial recourse when they lose in the political
arena. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985)
(Court declined to accord suspect status to classifications on basis of mental retardation, in
part by reasoning that legislative response to circumstances of mentally retarded people
"belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive
oversight by the judiciary"). No elected body is truly representative in the sense that every
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There are, of course, substantive constitutional limits to the
goals government may pursue,58 and government may not, even
with payment of compensation, take private property in pursuit of
goals which exceed those limits.5 9 However, absent a substantive
proscription, or some basis to be suspicious of the legislature's pro-
cedures or motives, 0 the democratic process should suffice to as-
sure us that the goal pursued is legitimate in the sense required by
the first question in our analysis. The primary question should be
whether interests adversely affected by the government action were
properly represented in the legislative process. It is unusual for the
interests of property owners to be inadequately represented, and so
it will be a relatively rare case in which government action is inval-
idated at this stage."'
element of the constituency is represented proportionately. However, courts reviewing legis-
lative acts must presume representativeness, absent evidence to the contrary. See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) ("legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for
legislative consideration and determination . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only
when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites").
" Among the substantive constitutional limits on goverment goals are those having
their origin in the equal protection clause (prohibiting racial exclusion, for example) and in
the first amendment (regulating the content of speech). See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (state's prosecutorial rights are subject to and limited by equal protection);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (state's goal
in regulating commercial speech must be directly advanced, and regulation cannot be more
extensive than necessary).
" See Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
1057 (1980). Even under the fifth amendment, the government's power to take property
with compensation is not absolute. See id. at 1091.
"0 Whether inevitable but "unintended" consequences of government action should be
treated as government ends for purposes of this stage of the analysis is an evidentiary ques-
tion. In other words, if it is determined that government in fact intended the foreseeable
consequences of its conduct, despite government's denial of that intent, the legitimacy of
the end should be examined. For an extended discussion of legislative motivation in this
context, see generally Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use
Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1988).
01 Such cases do exist, however. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267,
270 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987). The Wheeler court said:
Technically, the fifth amendment's just compensation clause is not applicable
where there has been no "public use." Such may be the case where, as here, the
land use regulation that effected the taking was not enacted in furtherance of the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The affected landowner may nev-
ertheless have a damage cause of action under section 1983 since the taking may
violate his fourteenth amendment rights to due process. [citations omitted] Re-
gardless of which constitutional provision a taking falls under, the measure of
damages to which the aggrieved landowner is entitled is the same.
Id. This latter proposition seems mistaken-the fifth amendment requires that a landowner
whose property has been taken for a public use receive just compensation; however, under
section 1983, an aggrieved landowner may be entitled not only to the fair market value of
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2. Even a Legitimate End Justifies Only Related Means
While the range of permissible purposes is accordingly very
broad, government must, in pursuit of legitimate ends, proceed ra-
tionally, by using means related to the end. A theory of govern-
ment is irrational if it requires government to pursue only legiti-
mate ends, but permits it to use any means, however tenuously
related to these ends. Indeed, it effectively undermines the insis-
tence upon legitimate ends.2
Until recently, governments could expect courts to defer to
their judgment on the means chosen to achieve their end, as well
as on their choice of end. In Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,63 the Court addressed the question whether government
may legitimately exercise its eminent domain power to effect a
change in the distribution of land ownership. "[W]here the exer-
cise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceiv-
able public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated tak-
ing to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. '6 4 Thus, when a
legislature, pursuing a legitimate goal, takes property and compen-
sates the landowner, courts will rarely invalidate the government
action. 5
A more interesting question arises when government regulates
land use in pursuit of a legitimate goal, and, in the process, inter-
feres with property rights without offer of compensation. Even
here, deference to legislative judgment had properly become the
rule. The Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty66 held that
"[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control. '6 7 Thus, if a plausible reason can be given for selecting a
his property, but also to consequential damages suffered as a consequence of the govern-
ment conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). It is not immediately obvious that these two
measures of damages would be equivalent.
'2 See G. HEGEL, supra note 39, at 140. Hegel describes the phrase "the end justifies
the means" as "trivial and pointless." "[Tihe means is precisely that which is nothing in
itself but is for the sake of something else, and therein, i.e. in the end, has its purpose and
worth-provided of course it be truly a means." Id.
63 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
64 Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
e' "When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our
cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the
federal courts." Id. at 242-43.
ee 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)).
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particular means to achieve a legitimate end, courts should defer to
legislative judgment .6  The Euclid Court, after summarizing the
municipality's reasons for its zoning plan, concluded:
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wis-
dom or sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we
have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons
are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. 9
Rejecting a plenary challenge to zoning in general, the Euclid
Court anticipated that specific challenges to zoning ordinances as
applied to a particular owner's property would arise.70 Such was
the case in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.71 The ordinance in
Nectow rendered a strip of Mr. Nectow's property totally useless
by zoning for residential use a piece of property which had only
commercial/industrial use. The Court invalidated the application
of the ordinance to his property, saying, "[t]he governmental
power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of
the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlim-
ited, and.., such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear
a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare. ' 72 The application of the ordinance to Mr. Nectow's
property was not invalidated because it effected a taking within
the meaning of the just compensation clause, but rather, because,
in violation of due process, it deprived him of all use of a piece of
" Note that deference to legislative judgment at this stage of the analysis does not
preclude finding a taking at a later stage. Deference here simply means that the government
conduct passes due process muster; the conduct still may have effected a taking. See Con-
nolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). The Connolly Court noted the
holding of a previous Supreme Court opinion:
[T]he Court held that retroactive application of the withdrawal liability provisions
of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In these cases, we address the ques-
tion whether the withdrawal liability provisions of the Act are valid under the
Clause of the Fifth Amendment that forbids the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.
Id. at 213.
9 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted).
70 See id. at 396-97.
7' 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
72 Id. at 188 (citation omitted).
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his property without substantially advancing the legitimate pur-
poses otherwise served by the zoning ordinance.73
Euclid and Nectow thus established that, while zoning is gen-
erally within the government's police power, it must be substan-
tially related to legitimate objectives if it is not to run afoul of due
process. 4
Until Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,7 5 the substantial
relationship test rarely served to invalidate legislation; instead
courts deferred to legislative judgment about both means and
end.7 6 In Nollan, beach front property owners challenged the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission's authority to condition a building per-
mit on the grant of an easement to the public across a private
beach. The Commission cited several purposes for the condition,
which the court assumed arguendo were legitimate: "protecting the
public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming
the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a devel-
oped shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public
beaches.'77 The Court held, however, that the "Commission's im-
position of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of
its land use power for any of these purposes, '17  because lateral ac-
cess across the beach contributed nothing to the public's view of
the beach from the road, and thus had no effect on the public's
"psychological barrier" to beach use.79 The "essential nexus" be-
" See id. at 188-89. "A taking of property by eminent domain for a use which is not
public is such a violation of the basic and essential features of constitutional government
that it amounts to a taking without due process of law." NiCHOLS, THE LAW OF EhIINENT
DOMAIN 4-38 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
74 It is worth stressing that Euclid and Nectow are due process cases, not takings cases.
Each deals explicitly with an alleged deprivation of property "without due process of law" in
violation of the fourteenth amendment and not with a taking for public use without just
compensation. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384; Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185. The difference is signif-
icant because government action which violates due process cannot be validated by paying
for it. Notwithstanding the insistence of the majority in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), that the "substantial relationship" test in takings cases is
different from the similarly named test in due process cases, Euclid and Nectow are the
sources of the substantial relationship test for the legitimacy of land use regulations relied
on by the Court in Nollan. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
75 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
71 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835. The Court assumed, without deciding, that these purposes
were legitimate. It would have been quite extraordinary had the Court declared these pur-
poses beyond the scope of the government's police power.
"' Id. at 839 (footnote omitted).
70 Permitting access across a private beach from one public beach to another presuma-
bly reduces congestion on the public beaches. The Court held, however, that "[i]t is ...
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tween means and end was lacking.80 Indeed, the means "utterly
fail[ed] to further the end"81 so that the case did "not meet even
the most untailored standards."82
The Nollan Court should have concluded that the condition,
lacking a substantial relationship to any legitimate purpose, vio-
lated due process. Despite history and principle to the contrary,
the Court insisted that the "substantial relationship" test applied
in takings cases is unique to the fifth amendment takings clause,
and is stricter than the similarly named due process standard. As
Justice Brennan persuasively argued in dissent, the condition was
sufficiently related to legitimate government purposes to pass due
process muster.84 Indeed, if it were not, how could the Court have
concluded that if the Commission "wants an easement across the
Nollans' property, it must pay for it"?8" In so saying, the Court
acknowledged that acquisition of an easement is an appropriate
means to achieve the government end, and is therefore consistent
with due process. Whether the easement must be paid for, in order
to conform to the just compensation clause, is an entirely different
question.8"
This concludes what might be termed the "due process" prong
of the inquiry.87 Government action which survives the due process
impossible to understand ... how [the easement] helps to remedy any additional congestion
on [the public beaches] caused by construction of the Nollans' new house." Id. at 838-39
(emphasis supplied).
8 See id. at 837. In reaching this conclusion, the Court "rewrote" the Commission's
argument "to eliminate [a] play on words," id. at 839, suggesting that deference to the judg-
ment of some quasi-legislative bodies is a thing of the past. The refusal to defer to the
judgment of quasi-legislative bodies may be appropriate. Such bodies do not enjoy the same
presumption of representativeness as elected bodies. See supra note 57 and accompanying
text. Given the Court's tendency to defer to professional judgment, however, its refusal to
do so in the land-use regulation context is somewhat puzzling.
81 483 U.S. at 837.
82 Id. at 838.
" Id. at 834-35. Decisions such as this only add to the existing confusion in this area.
84 Id. at 853-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 842. The reasoning of the Nollan opinion challenges our methodological pre-
sumption that courts mean what they say!
88 The Court correctly answered this question in the affirmative; the Court is correct,
however, not because the means is insufficiently related to the end, but because the means
(acquisition of an easement) destroys the right to exclude. See infra, notes 104-17 and ac-
companying text. The Court's analysis suggests that the government may validate its arbi-
trary action through monetary compensation, a suggestion which could ultimately loosen
rather than tighten the means-end standard.
87 See Carlisle, The Section 1983 Land Use Case: Justice Stevens And The Hunt For
The Taking Quark, 16 STETSON L. REv. 565, 570 (1987) ("[n]ot only does the Due Process
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inquiry must still run the takings gauntlet.
3. No End Justifies any Uncompensated Means Which
Permanently Destroys an Essential Property Right8s
As we saw in our examination of Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, s9 if government takes property and provides compensa-
tion, this exercise of the power of eminent domain will be upheld if
it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. Government
action which interferes with an owner's use of property without
providing compensation for the loss occasioned by the interference
is a greater problem. The fundamental questions here are whether
there are any property rights so essential that government may not
destroy them even in pursuit of legitimate ends without compensa-
tion; 0 and, if so, what property rights are to count as essential?
Whether Q3 is posed at all depends upon one's notion of the
origin of property-is property held at the will of the sovereign or
in trust for the public," or is property ownership a fundamental
personal right? If the former, property rights are always
subordinate to at least some public interests; if the latter, presum-
ably no public purpose is sufficient to justify destruction of an es-
sential property right. Both Hegel and Locke appear to take the
clause require that the use of governmental power serve valid objectives, it further requires
that the means chosen by government to serve those objectives not be arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable"); Costonis, supra note 6, at 485.
88 See Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n., 450 A.2d 475,
482 (Me. 1982) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980)). "Since ownership
consists of a 'bundle' of property rights, the mere extinguishment of one of those rights does
not necessarily amount to a taking without compensation. The question is whether the right
in question constitutes 'a fundamental attribute of ownership' such that its extinguishment
would render the property substantially useless." Id.
86 467 U.S. 229 (1984). See also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
96 It seems implicit in the fifth amendment that there are such property rights. See
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1987) ("Indeed. . .rights would
become worthless if the government possessed an uncontrollable power over the private for-
tune of every citizen").
"' Land held at the will of the sovereign or in trust for the public is land held subject to
an "implied servitude ab initio." Michelman, supra note 50, at 1602 n.14. Property bur-
dened with such a servitude (for example, the navigational servitude of the United States)
cannot be used in such a way as to interfere with the servitude. A landowner may not use
riparian property in a manner that interferes with the public's use of navigable waters. See
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445 (1892). Insofar as the property is held in
trust for the public, a riparian owner has no legitimate expectation of interference with
navigation. In this respect, the riparian owner has no cognizable property interest (in inter-
fering with navigation) to be taken. The nuisance cases can be similarly rationalized. See
infra, notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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second position, at least with respect to those property rights es-
sential to liberty or personhood.
Certain property rights are so essential to liberty (in Lockean
terms) or personhood (in Hegelian terms) that they are unassaila-
ble by government without preservation of the status quo by pay-
ment of compensation. 2 If we take the Lockean view, i.e. that the
governed participate in society to protect their property interests,
it would be "too gross an absurdity for any man to own" that there
be no limits on government's power to interfere with those prop-
erty interests.9 3 Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to postulate
that government may not, without payment of full compensation
for the damage caused, destroy an essential property right. 4 It was
Hegel's view that the first objective expression of personality or
personhood is the acquisition of property, the subjection of a thing
to one's will.9 5 For Hegel, this first expression of personhood is the
foundation of civil society and the state.9 Therefore, if the state
were permitted to destroy essential property rights, it would be un-
dermining its own foundation. Locke, rather similarly, viewed gov-
ernment's existence as a means to protect property rights and were
the government to destroy these rights, it would be undermining
its own reason for existence.9 Payment of money, "the universal
91 Indeed, some rights are so essential to liberty or personhood that government could
not preserve the status quo by payment of compensation for their destruction. "[T]hose
goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute my own private personality
and the universal essence of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my right to them is
impresciptible." G. HEGEL, supra note 39, § 66, at 52. See also Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 1014-15 (1982) (suggesting that "personal" property should
be protected from both conflicting "fungible" property claims and from governmental inva-
sion). Government cannot purchase the right to own property, for example. For this reason
the Constitution has no clause providing that: "nor shall liberty be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Nonetheless, government may, in pursuit of legitimate govern-
ment purposes, buy any particular piece of property from its owner.
J' j. LocKE, supra note 39, at § 138.
Degrees of interference short of destruction will be dealt with later. See infra notes
142-52 and accompanying text. That government may, upon payment of compensation, de-
stroy even an essential property right follows from the well-established power of government
to dispossess an owner upon payment of compensation, so long as the expropriation serves a
legitimate public purpose. If destruction of all property rights in a particular piece of prop-
erty is within government's eminent domain power, destruction of an essential property
right short of dispossession is also within that power.
9 G. HEGEL, supra note 39, § 44, at 41.
9 See id. § 258, at 155.
9 In Locke's worldview, "[t]he great end of men's entering into society [is] the enjoy-
ment of their properties in peace and safety." See J. LocKS, supra note 39, at § 134. Accord-
ingly, government "cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own
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medium of exchange... which actualizes the. . .value of all com-
modities,"98 for the destruction of an essential property right per-
mits government to conduct its necessary business while preserving
the status quo ante.9
Hegel's account of the acquisition and use of private property
is useful in understanding what should be deemed essential prop-
erty rights. For Hegel, the appropriation of things is the first ex-
pression of personality, and is the foundation of the State.100 One
would therefore expect that the state, as its law develops, would
protect at least those aspects of property essential to personhood,
which, for Hegel, are exclusive possession, use, and alienation.101
Hegel would expect these elements, each of which is con-
temporarily recognized as essential, 102 to be further articulated as
society matures. 03
consent." Id. at § 138. Legislative power "is limited to the public good of the society." Id. at
§ 135. The government's "power for the regulating of property," id. at § 139, is therefore
limited to preserving property, the only reason "men [initially] enter into society." Id. at §
138. Locke used "property" in a rather expansive sense, to include one's life, liberties, and
estate. Id. at § 123. Arguably, this is the sense in which the framers of the Constitution
intended to use "property," at least in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See
LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONsrrTurioN 276 (1988). Locke's influence on the
framers of the United States Constitution is well known, although not entirely uncontrover-
sial. See, e.g., WILLS, INVENTING AhmRICA (1978) (arguing that Hume and Hutcheson were
more influential on the framers than Locke). Nonetheless, Locke's philosophy remains con-
genial to the U.S. system, and the framers were thoroughly Lockean in their outlook. See
LEVY, supra, at 276. It is by no means evident what limits on government goals are imposed
under the Lockean scheme, or what the framers understood as the limits.
91 G. HEGEL, supra note 39, at § 204(b)(2), at 132.
90 Preservation of the status quo ante is not necessarily a good thing. The present dis-
tribution of property may, after all, be an unjust distribution. Nonetheless, the function of
the just compensation clause is an inherently conservative one. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN,
supra note 4. "There is, I think, an almost inevitably conservative quality to compensation
litigation, however much a reformer may try to write an opinion that avoids the symbolic
affirmation of the status quo ante involved in compensating property owners aggrieved by
the concededly legitimate exercise of public power." Id. at 60. Thus, while the government
may "adjust the burdens and benefits of economic life," Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), and so may act to change the status quo ante by
redistribution of property, the government may not achieve its redistributional aims by de-
struction of essential property rights. Thus, in Hawaii Housing Authority, the government
was permitted to redistribute property, but was required to assure that the dispossessed
landowners were properly compensated. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 244-45 (1983).
110 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101 G. HEGEL, supra note 39, § 53, at 46. These elements are also recognized as essential
by Blackstone. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 8-15. Indeed, they form the core of the
classical liberal conception of property. See Radin, supra note 14, at 1685.
102 See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
103 "[T]he constitution becomes progressively more mature in the course of the further
elaboration of the laws and the advancing character of the universal business of govern-
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Perhaps the Supreme Court's clearest recognition that govern-
ment may not destroy an essential property right without payment
of compensation came in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corporation.10 4 In Loretto, the Court adopted its much-crit-
icized 0 5 per se rule that any government-authorized physical inva-
sion of private property, however minor and whatever public inter-
est it may serve, is a compensable taking.106 Despite the rather
minor intrusion and minimal interference with the plaintiff's prop-
erty use, the Court held that the government had authorized a per-
manent, physical occupation of her property and must compensate
her for it.' 0 7 The Court noted that "[p]roperty rights in a physical
thing have been described as the rights 'to possess, use and dispose
of it,' 108 and concluded that a permanent occupation by govern-
ment "effectively destroys each of these rights.'
10 9
a. The right to exclude
Although the Court in Loretto held that a permanent physical
occupation destroys all three essential property rights, the right to
exclude, "one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle
of property rights," ' 0O is clearly central. A physical occupation, ac-
cording to the Court, "is qualitatively more severe than a regula-
tion of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirma-
tive duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over
the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.""'
The right to exclude was also critical to the Court's decision in
ment." G. HEGEL, supra note 39, § 298, at 193. For further exploration of the significance of
Hegel for contemporary legal theory, see Hegel and Legal Theory Symposium, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. Nos 5-6 (1989).
104 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
"' See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 6, at 501. ("The per se rule is unsatisfactory on lin-
guistic, historical, and functional grounds.") Although the Loretto rule has been subjected to
harsh criticism, much of that criticism and indeed much of the confusion about takings law
generally stems from a failure to distinguish the liability stage of the inquiry from the reme-
dial stage. It is clear that any government-authorized, permanent, physical occupation of
private property amounts to a taking of property, because it destroys the right to exclude.
Whether the taking is minor, and so justifies only nominal damages, is a remedy question,
not a liability question.
10I Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. In Loretto, the plaintiff challenged a New York statute
permitting a cable television company to place boxes and cables on her property. Id. at 424.
107 Id. at 441.
108 Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 436.
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,112 in which the Court,
citing the Loretto rule, said:
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individ-
ual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises.'13
Loretto and Nollan serve to clarify the holding in Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins," 4 in which the Court found that, al-
though there was a literal "taking" of the right to exclude,
the requirement that appellants [shopping center] permit appel-
lees [citizens] to exercise state-protected rights of free expression
and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount
to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights
under the Taking Clause. There is nothing to suggest that
preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will
unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shop-
ping center.'15
Pruneyard, after Loretto and Nollan, can be understood to
mean that a destruction of the right to exclude, while still a taking,
may be so de minimis as not to require compensation." 6 Govern-
ment, in short, may not, even in pursuit of legitimate objectives,
permanently destroy the right to exclude without payment of just
compensation. 11
112 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
"I Id. at 832 (footnote omitted). Nollan's interpretation of Loretto tends to confirm the
view that the right to exclude is central, as a public easement impairs but does not destroy
the rights to use and dispose. Despite the Loretto Court's broader language, the rights to
dispose and use were certainly impaired by installation of the cable box but were surely not
destroyed.
11 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Id. at 83.
16 This reconstruction of Pruneyard, which strays only slightly from the Court's analy-
sis, serves to illustrate how important it is to clarify the distinction between liability and
remedy. Although the Loretto result is counterintuitive when viewed from the remedial per-
spective, it makes eminent sense when considered as a question of liability.
117 It has recently been argued that the Nollan court ameliorated the Loretto per se
taking rule by suggesting that, if there is a sufficient nexus between means (the per se tak-
ing) and end, no compensation is required for the taking. See Martinez, supra note 6, at 59-
65. This further proves the confusion Nollan has wrought.
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b. The right to use
The Lorretto court also acknowledged the importance of the
right to use property."' The right to put land to any particular use
is not an essential property right; instead courts have made it clear
that a landowner's use of property is subject to government regula-
tion,"9 and a landowner may not complain that the property is
restricted to a use other than that which is most beneficial.2 0
Nonetheless, a taking is properly found when a government regula-
tion of land use prohibits all viable use of property.' 21 In other
words, essential to the landowner's bundle of rights is the right to
put one's property to some use. 122
Accordingly, government may not permanently destroy the
right to use one's property without payment of compensation. 23
118 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (1982).
119 See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 80-81 (1980). "It is, of course, well established that a
State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private prop-
erty so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation or
contravene any other federal constitutional provision." Id. (citations omitted).
20 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (Court looks to degree of infringe-
ment and economically viable use, not most beneficial use).
21 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (complete conver-
sion of property is taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (if landowner
cannot put property to use, loss is complete and a taking has occurred).
122 It is appropriate to note that nuisance cases, which permit the government to pro-
hibit noxious uses, simply affirm the principle that, while a property owner may not be
denied all use without payment of compensation, he may be denied any (particular) use
deemed by government to be injurious to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare, without payment of compensation. The nuisance cases, typically couched in terms of
the overwhelming weight of the government interest, are simply special cases of the balanc-
ing analysis, to which we return later. See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
The cases suggesting that the government may render property useless if pursuing over-
whelming ends do not stand for so broad a proposition. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, passim (1962) (no evidence that town ordinance prohibiting excavation below
water level would leave property valueless); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)
(owner retained cedar trees' value as lumber despite comprehensive statutory scheme pro-
viding for destruction of trees in order to save apple orchards from communicable plant
disease); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1915) (city ordinance prohibiting
manufacture of bricks within city limits did not render property useless as it did not en-
tirely prohibit removal of red clay by property owner); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664
(1887) (liquor factory owner retained valuable land despite statute prohibiting manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquor). It is inaccurate to cite these cases for the proposition that
the government may entirely destroy property value if its purpose is sufficiently overwhelm-
ing. Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that government may, in pursuit of a
sufficiently weighty public purpose, prohibit any particular use.
123 Even if a landowner retains formal rights in property which has been rendered val-
ueless (such as the right to exclude, the right to visit, etc.), "[i]f that which is left to the
property owner is rendered meaningless by that which is taken, compensation is due." Flor-
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c. The right to dispose
Also recognized by the Loretto Court as an essential property
right is the right to dispose of one's property.124 The right to dis-
pose includes the right of devise or descent. In Hodel v. Irving125
the Court indicated that the complete abolition of the descent and
devise of a particular class of property would be a taking.126 The
Court has not unambiguously held that governmental destruction
of the right to dispose requires compensation, but a tendency in
that direction is evident. Accordingly, government may not perma-
nently destroy the right to dispose of one's property without pay-
ment of compensation.
No other sticks in the bundle of rights called "property"' 27
have been declared so essential as to require compensation for
their permanent destruction. Indeed, it is perhaps overstating the
point to claim that the Supreme Court has unambiguously adopted
the liberal conception of property just adumbrated.12 s Nonetheless,
contrary to the trend,1 29 I would favor more, not fewer, per se
rules. Insofar as property is conceptually a set of expectations,130
any rule which tends to settle expectations is, in that respect at
ida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 166 (1985).
A corollary to the right to use, held essential by some courts, is the right of access.
"Total deprivation of... [a landowner's] right to access constitutes a taking of his prop-
erty." Luf v. Town of Southbury, 449 A.2d 1001, 1005 (Conn. 1982); see also City of Orlando
v. Cullom, 400 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (right of access to one's property
cannot be taken without payment of just compensation); Department of Transp. v. White-
head, 253 Ga. 150, 151, 317 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1984) (destruction of access easement to public
highway is compensable taking even though other means of access remain); Mulkins v.
Board of Supervisors, 374 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Iowa 1985) (just compensation required when
access is interfered with substantially); Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113, 119, 727 P.2d 904, 910
(1986) (individual has right to go from and return to property without unreasonable inter-
ference); Beer v. Minnesota Power and Light, 400 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Minn. 1987) (right of
access may be destroyed for public use only upon payment of just compensation).
124 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1981).
125 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
12 Id. at 717. "[A] total abrogation of these rights [of descent and devise] cannot be
upheld." Id.
127 See B. CARD0ZO, THE PARADOX OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928).
1'8 In its reasoning the Court has not clearly adopted the rules of decision I propose; in
result, however, it has.
129 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 50; Radin, The Liberal Conception, supra note 14.
... See Michelman, supra note 50, at 1211-12. "[P]roperty [is] 'a basis of expectations'
founded on existing rules; that is to say, property is the institutionally established under-
standing that extant rules governing the relationships among men with respect to resources
will continue in existence." Id. (citing J. BENTHAht, THEORY OF LEGISLATION chs. 7-10 (6th
ed. 1890)).
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least, a good rule.1' 1 As takings law presently stands, however, ap-
plication of these formal rules is, in a few cases, inconclusive. In
the analysis of these few cases, there comes a point when an un-
abashed balancing is necessary.
4. The End Otherwise Justifies the Means When the Value to
the Public of the End Outweighs the Private Harm Occasioned
by the Means
Implicit in the rule that government may not destroy an es-
sential property right without payment of compensation is the pos-
sibility that government may destroy nonessential property rights
without payment of compensation. A sensible theory of the rela-
tionship between government and the governed might permit such
interference if, at the very least, the injured landowner also
benefitted from the regulation. Such is indeed the rationale behind
the so-called "public nuisance" exception to the just compensation
clause, which permits government to prohibit land uses that are
injurious in part on the basis that all landowners benefit from the
prohibition. 13 2
Although the Supreme Court has not in recent years upheld a
land use regulation solely on the basis that it serves such an "over-
whelming" public purpose, the "public nuisance" exception to the
just compensation clause remains viable. 33 In Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,'3 4 the Court unanimously
approved a "public nuisance" exception to the just compensation
clause. According to the majority, the Court hesitates "to find a
taking when the State merely restrains uses of property that are
"' See Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577 (1988)
(hard-edged rules-"crystals"-"signal to all of us, in a clear and distinct language, precisely
what our obligations are and how we may take care of our interests"); see also Rose-Acker-
man, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1988)
("[w]hen legal rules affect behavior, clarity is a value in itself, independent of the actual
content of the rule").
132 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)
("[w]hile each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly
from the restrictions that are placed on others").
... In several early fifth amendment cases, the Court upheld state regulations which
prohibited public nuisances, even though the effect on private property owners was ex-
tremely severe. See supra note 122. Although the Court in Keystone found that the regula-
tion in question was valid in part because it prohibited a public nuisance, the Court did not
rest its decision solely on that ground.
134 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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tantamount to public nuisances.""'35 The dissenting Justices agreed
that the Court has recognized an exception to the takings clause
when the government "exercises its unquestioned authority to pre-
vent a property owner from using his property to injure others
without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use."' 3
While agreeing that there is such an exception, the dissenting Jus-
tices disputed the majority's conclusion that the Subsidence Act
satisfied this exception.137
Although it has become fashionable to mock courts which rely
on prohibition of noxious use in upholding government regulation
of land use, 3 8 the principle underlying the rule seems sound.
Landowners should not have the right to use their property in a
manner injurious to the public.139 Whether a particular use is inju-
rious is for the legislature to determine. In other words, courts
should not decide whether a use prohibited by government is inju-
rious, but rather should defer to the judgment of a properly repre-
sentative legislature, acting within appropriate substantive lim-
its.' 4 When a government regulation prohibits a use deemed by
the legislature to be injurious to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare, and the regulation does not permanently destroy
an essential property right, no taking has occurred.' 4' Such govern-
ment purposes presumptively outweigh nonessential private prop-
erty rights.
On the other hand, when a government regulation serves a le-
gitimate end other than prohibition of a noxious use, and inter-
feres with, but does not destroy, a property owner's use and enjoy-
ment of his property, the takings question turns on the relative
weights of the public value and the private harm. Only in such
cases is this truly difficult balancing question presented.
In Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York,142
... Id. at 491.
Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 50; Sax, supra note 4.
"Significantly, the drafter of the taking clause, James Madison, incorporated the
Blackstonian definition in his writing on property and specifically excluded uses of property
that harmed others by not 'leav[ing] to every one else the like advantage.'" Kmiec, The
Original Understanding Of The Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1630, 1635 (1988) (citing Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 J.
MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (1983)).
140 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
1,1 See supra note 122.
142 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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the owners of Grand Central Terminal challenged the application
to the terminal of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law. 43
New York City's Landmark Commission denied the owners per-
mission to construct an office building atop the terminal, resulting
in a significant loss of value to the owners.144 Ruling against the
owners, the Court nonetheless indicated that a regulatory taking
could occur when the balancing of certain factors, representing pri-
vate and public interests, is overwhelmingly in favor of the private
interest.145 While the Court insisted that it was unable to establish
a "set formula" for determining when a regulatory taking has oc-
curred,46 it identified several relevant factors. Among the factors
considered relevant on the private side of the balance is "[t]he eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations.' 147 While this factor arguably dis-
criminates against landowners whose possession is gratuitous,'14 it
is appropriately considered in most cases. Also relevant to the bal-
ance is "the character of the governmental action.' 49 Moreover, a
taking will not be found when the landowner enjoys sufficient "rec-
iprocity of advantage."' 0
Thus, when a land-use regulation sufficiently interferes with a
landowner's economic expectations, and the public interest served
by the regulation is insufficiently weighty, a taking may, at least in
143 Id. at 107.
144 Id. at 130-31.
145 Id. at 124-25. See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (question whether
taking occurred "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests").
'41 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Penn Central is a paradigm example of a hard case
making bad law. Having decided, under the circumstances of that case, that it would have to
conduct an essentially ad hoc factual inquiry, the Court apparently decided that it would
have to do so in all takings cases. The Court has allowed the penumbra of doubt to over-
whelm the core of certainty. See H. HART,, supra note 12.
Penn Central, 428 U.S. at 124. It would appear that the Court derived this language
from Michelman. See Michelman, supra note 4. Frustration of economic expectations is
arguably a necessary but not a sufficient condition of finding a taking at the balancing stage
of the analysis. Other factors are relevant to the question of whether "'justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government."
Penn Central, 428 U.S. at 124.
"I See Johnson, Compensation For Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REv. 559
(1981). Professor Johnson argues that although people who acquire land by inheritance or
gift have no "investment-backed" expectations they may nonetheless have expectations
which are as worthy of protection as those who have invested. Id. at 566.
, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
110 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987) (citing
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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principle, be found to have occurred. In this case, government may
either validate the regulation by payment of compensation or re-
scind the regulation.' 5 ' Provided that courts correctly identify and
apply the appropriate relevant factors, there is no reason why the
balancing test of Penn Central cannot be applied in a principled
way. Balancing tests, while inherently less predictable than resolu-
tion of cases by application of formal rules,- are not, by that token,
unprincipled.152
The question whether government can be found liable for tem-
porary regulatory takings has been of recent interest. If a regula-
tion survives examination until the balancing stage of the analysis,
whether a temporary taking has occurred should turn again on the
balance.
As Loretto teaches, a physical occupation of private property
by government is a compensable taking because it destroys the
right to exclude, and probably destroys as well the rights to use
and dispose. 53 Even a temporary physical occupation should be
deemed a taking. 54 The Court in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. Los Angeles155 assumed, by analogy to physical
occupation, that a regulation which would take property if permit-
ted to remain in effect permanently takes property even if in effect
only temporarily.15 s If the taking were of the physical occupation
"I See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
12 But see Symposium, supra note 15, at 1589-99 (examination of coherent approach to
takings issue often pits rules against balancing).
'8' See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
1 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987). Although Loretto involved a permanent, physical occupation, surely the First Eng-
lish Court is right that the government cannot "untake" the property simply by moving out.
Id. The damage to the owner's property rights has been done. Regulatory takings are differ-
ent. See Penn Central, 483 U.S. at 124. "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government...
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good." Id. (citation omitted).
III 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
155 Id. at 2388. After citation to a series of physical occupation cases, the Court con-
cludes that" 'temporary' takings which.., deny a landowner all use of his property, are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires com-
pensation." Id. Justice Stevens, dissenting, disputed the Court's reliance on the analogy.
"Just because a plaintiff can prove that a land-use restriction would constitute a taking if
allowed to remain in effect permanently does not mean that he or she can also prove that its
temporary application rose to the level of a constitutional taking." Id. at 2396 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens surely has the better argument. The Court's presumption stems
from the confusion between the liability and remedy stages of the analysis. A landowner
subject to a permanent regulation is entitled to a remedy if the regulation takes his prop-
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kind, this proposition would be unexceptional-a physical occupa-
tion destroys at least the right to exclude, whether permanent or
not. However, the question whether a taking has occurred when an
invalid regulation has been only temporarily in effect is very differ-
ent from the question whether a taking would occur were the regu-
lation to remain in effect indefinitely.157 Arguably, a temporary
taking should be found only if the government regulation de-
stroyed, albeit temporarily, the rights to exclude, use and dispose.
Such a taking, once committed, cannot be undone by subsequent
government conduct.
Furthermore, invalidation of the regulation affects the bal-
ance. In other words, to determine whether a temporary taking has
occurred, the court should conduct anew the balancing of compet-
ing interests. Even if a landowner's property was rendered worth-
less for a short period of time, a taking may not have occurred if
invalidation of the regulation would restore the owner's invest-
ment-backed expectations.
Restoration of an owner's economic expectations renders the
private harm, in most circumstances, de minimis, thereby tipping
the balance back in favor of the government. In this respect, a
temporary reduction in the value of property, even to zero, does
not necessarily constitute a taking, even though a permanent re-
duction of such magnitude would classify as a taking.
B. Distinguishing Liability from Remedy
It has been suggested that much of the confusion in takings
law is caused by a failure to distinguish between the liability and
remedy phases of the analysis.158 The confusion between these
phases arises because it seems counterintuitive to hold the govern-
ment liable for a de minimis taking, such as the intrusion in
Loretto, while not holding the government liable for a significant
diminution in value, such as that caused by the refusal to permit
development in Penn Central. Under the clear theory of liability
erty; it simply does not follow that he is entitled to another remedy (for a "temporary"
taking) if his remedy for the first violation is invalidation of the offending regulation.
107 Even if the Court concludes that the regulation would effect a taking if permitted to
remain in force-in which case the Court may invalidate the regulation or require the govern-
ment to pay compensation should it wish to keep the regulation in effect-its affirmative
answer to that question has little bearing on the question of whether a temporary taking has
occurred.
1"8 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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offered here, it should be evident that the State of New York was
appropriately found liable for a taking in Loretto because it had
authorized a permanent, physical occupation and so had destroyed
the right to exclude. Damages, nonetheless, were minimal.159 Per-
haps less evidently, because the case was resolved at the balancing
stage of the analysis, the City of New York, having determined
that the terminal was a precious landmark, was appropriately
found not liable in Penn Central since the terminal's owners re-
tained property of considerable value. In other words, except in the
special, limiting case where loss of value is total,160 the question of
liability is not driven by the degree of harm suffered by a land-
owner subject to government regulation. Indeed, the degree of
harm is not even relevant until the balancing stage of the analysis.
II. THE REMEDY PHASE
Some observations on the question of remedy follow from the
preceding analysis of takings cases. If a government regulation is
determined to be substantially related to a legitimate government
purpose, is found not permanently to destroy an essential property
right, and is found to serve public interests weightier than any pri-
vate harm it occasions, then it is valid under the foregoing analysis.
Otherwise, two distinct determinations of invalidity are possible:
simple invalidity, and invalidity absent compensation.
When a government regulation is declared invalid at the "due
process" stage of the inquiry (Q1 or Q2), an injured landowner
should be able to recover consequential damages, usually under 42
U.S.C. section 1983.61 Since a regulation which violates due pro-
cess ipso facto serves no legitimate public purpose, it falls outside
the public use limitation of the just compensation clause. Accord-
"" See Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 135 App. Div. 2d 444, 446, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545
(1st Dep't 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 78 (1988). Rejecting Loretto's application for attor-
neys' fees, the Court noted that her success in establishing that the statute effected a taking
"is of purely academic interest since, as a practical matter, there is little reason to believe
that landlords will receive any greater amount in what is now denominated 'just compensa-
tion' than they would have previously received in what was then termed 'reasonable com-
pensation.' " Id. at 448, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 546. "Reasonable compensation," under the statute,
would in most cases be $1.00. Id.
100 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
'6' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Whether recovery is prohibited by the eleventh amendment
is a question beyond the scope of this paper. Section 1983 states in pertinent part "Every
Person, who, under color of any statute... subjects ... any citizen. . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured."
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ingly, government may not validate its arbitrary action by paying
for it. Indeed, arbitrary exercise of the eminent domain power is as
much a violation of due process as arbitrary exercise of the police
power. 16
2
On the other hand, should the regulation be declared invalid
absent compensation at the "takings" stage of the inquiry (Q3 or
Q4), the aggrieved landowner, in the event the government wishes
to persist in its regulation, should recover just compensation. In-
deed, after First English, the aggrieved landowner can probably
recover some compensation even if the government does not wish
to persist in its taking.
The two measures of recovery, damages for deprivation of
property in violation of due process, and just compensation for a
taking of private property for public use, are not identical. Conse-
quential damages stemming from a due process violation may in-
clude loss of profit, loss of potential sales, etc. Under a theory of
just compensation, however, the government must pay the fair
market value of the property. In Nollan, the government had, by
its conduct, effectively condemned an easement across the Nollans'
property. While the purpose of acquiring the easement was legiti-
mate, and hence fell within the public use limitation of the just
compensation clause, the acquisition of the easement destroyed the
right to exclude by requiring the Nollans to permit permanent
public access across their property.163 Accordingly, while the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission was permitted to acquire the easement
in pursuit of its legitimate purposes, it was also required to pay for
it. 6 4
CONCLUSION
Three factors contribute to the apparent intractability of the
"takings question:"
(1) the failure to distinguish between deprivations of property
without due process and takings of property without just
compensation;
(2) the failure to distinguish between questions of liability and
questions of remedy; and
102 See supra notes 23 and 39 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
' This statement of the Nollan holding follows the analysis developed in this article,
rather than the less clear analysis of the Court.
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(3) the insistence on applying the Penn Central balancing test in
cases which can better be resolved by application of formal rules.
Lack of clarity about the distinction between deprivations and
takings and the distinction between the liability and the remedy
stages of the analysis has led courts to despair of ever finding for-
mal rules that are helpful in resolving takings cases. As the forego-
ing analysis demonstrates, however, with these distinctions clearly
in mind, the takings question is not so inscrutable as it first
appears.
Takings law, properly understood, involves both formal rules
and balancing. The formal rules, although each has its own "core
of certainty" and "penumbra of doubt," serve to solve many depri-
vation/takings cases. Application of a balancing test is required
only after the formal rules have failed to dispose of the case. There
are far fewer cases in which courts need to resort to an essentially
ad hoc factual inquiry than at first appears. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible to conduct such an inquiry in a principled and predictable
way, as relevant factors are identified and weighed in the balance
from one case to the next.
The law of takings can therefore be understood in a principled
way, and its challenge to the view that the legal system is princi-
pled is accordingly met.
1989]
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